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Russia’s Rising Military and Communication Power: From Chechnya to Crimea 
 
In a 2012 interview with the Russian newspaper Kommersant, RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita 
Simonyan declared that “[i]t’s impossible just to start making guns when the war has already 
started! Therefore, the Ministry of Defence is not fighting now, but is ready for defence. So are 
we” (Gabuyev 2012).. Her statement captures how Russia’s military resurgence and its use of 
international news and social media have become inextricably linked. Yet many scholars working 
on Russia’s use of international news and social media under-appreciate this relationship. They do 
recognise the importance of the Russian state in Russia’s use of strategic narratives. After all, states 
are significant—if not the most significant—political actors that use strategic narratives in order 
to communicate their values, to influence others, and to strengthen their own international or 
domestic appeal. Nevertheless, we argue that scholars must pay greater attention to how hard 
power and soft power not only co-vary, but can work together. 
 
In this essay, we show how Russia has deliberately developed its military power and media 
policy in tandem, with these two foreign policy instruments supporting one another while helping 
to project a certain image of the country. By Russia, we mean the administration of President 
Vladimir Putin, and the ministries, especially of Foreign Affairs and Defence, which implement 
its foreign and security policy. In driving the policy agenda, the Kremlin can use hard military 
power, but it is not simply the case that ‘[t]he use of military force, for example, can be understood 
to be part of the narrative projection of a state’ (Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin 2015: 75). 
The way the Russian state uses what Castells (2009) termed ‘communication power’—especially 
where ‘the key mechanisms of state control over the media take place through bureaucratic and 
financial controls of media networks, either directly or indirectly’ (2009: 268)—can accentuate  
military intervention for better or for worse, as far as its image is concerned. 
 
Our essay proceeds as follows. We first argue that scholars have neglected the 
‘communication power’ dimension of how Russia seeks to exert influence in military conflicts. 
We then show how military power and communication power have interacted in the Chechen wars, 
the 2008 Russian-Georgian War; and Russian activities in Ukraine since 2014. In each case, we 
identify Russia’s strengths and weaknesses in terms of its military capability, and analyse how the 
Russian government and armed forces sought, or did not seek, to control and to influence the media 
reporting of their military campaigns. 
 
Hard, Soft, and Communication Power in Russia’s Wars 
 
Hard power typically denotes the military capabilities that a state can use to affect outcomes in 
war and diplomacy. Soft power, in Nye’s (2006) original formulation, refers to how states can 
leverage the appeal of their own institutions, values, and cultural products to exert influence upon 
others, whether to create policy consensus or to advance a common understanding on how to 
address shared challenges. As Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin (2015) note, however, 
exactly how soft power operates in shaping outcomes has been unclear, especially with regards to 
which resources states use to generate soft power. Accordingly, they advocate the study of strategic 
narratives, arguing that strategic narratives belong to the communication process that a state 
cultivates in order to convey how they understand the world, what interests it has, and how it 
frames its decisions vis-à-vis multiple audiences. Strategic narratives can be deployed alongside 
2 
 
hard power. Because of advances in literacy and communication technology, states are compelled 
to make investments to control an increasingly contested discursive environment (Roselle, 
Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin, 2015: 77-78).  
 
 Much of the literature to date on Russia and strategic narratives understates the role of the 
state and how soft power is a force multiplier with respect to hard power. Of course, an awareness 
exists that ‘great-powerness’ is a motif in Russian strategic narratives and that the Kremlin 
interprets this status as a vital national interest (Feklyunina, 2016; Miskimmon and O’Loughlin, 
2017). In empirical studies, however, the state plays largely a background role, with hard power 
being more of a contextual variable than one that bears directly on the analysis. Makhtorykh and 
Sydorova (2017) usefully describe how pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian online communities on 
Vkontakte produce different framings over the course of the Donbas conflict, with pro-Russian 
groups consistently focusing on civilian suffering and malfeasance committed by Ukrainian 
authorities. Yet their study does not consider how state authorities on either side of the conflict 
might be pushing such frames. Koltsova and Pashakhin (2019) contrast Russia’s Channel 1 
coverage of the war in eastern Ukraine with that of Ukraine’s Channel 5 between September 2013 
and September 2014, owned by then Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko. They find that the 
content of their reporting diverged, with Channel 1 highlighting more often refugee problems in 
eastern Ukraine and violent clashes in Ukrainian cities. These results demonstrate that news 
coverage can track with how a conflict spirals, suggesting that media policy may simply be a 
reflection, or even an artifact of, state behaviour. Another study of Channel One—owned by close 
associates of Russian President Vladimir Putin—confirms that its portrayal of Ukrainians 
“underwent modification in accordance with the agenda of the Russian political elite” 
(Khaldarova, 2019: 2). Arguably, the scholarly focus on variation in media framings obscures the 
role of the state. If this variation is endogenous to state behaviour, as these studies apparently 
confirm, then we should study instead state behaviour. 
 
 Another problem is that the concept of ‘soft power’ can still lack analytical precision even 
when incorporating notions of ‘strategic narratives’. Saying that Russian strategic narratives serve 
the Kremlin’s agenda is insufficient. As shown below, Russia’s use of media policy has co-varied 
with the effectiveness of its military power. We argue that ‘communication power’ is a more 
helpful concept. After all, ‘soft power’ can encompass Fabergé exhibitions, Tolstoy novels, and 
the Bolshoi ballet tour. These cultural goods allow Russia to project a particular international 
image of itself and even generate international sympathy, if not affection. However, they do not 
advance, for example, Russian aims in a military conflict with Ukraine. In our view, 
‘communication power’ is a component of ‘soft power’. It involves the concerted use by state 
institutions of media outlets and media content to craft a certain image or narrative related to that 
state’s military and foreign policy goals. ‘Communication power’ is not relational, insofar as it can 
reflect an ability to manipulate a target audience, but it can be a force multiplier for military power 
by helping to broadcast favourable views about one’s security goals.  
 
 ‘Communication power’ can augment, or weaken, military campaigns in two ways. The 
first is to enhance the perceived legitimacy of the state and its efforts while denigrating those of 
the adversary. The ultimate aim could be to build international and domestic support for the state’s 
cause. However, because such causal connections are hard to determine, we are agnostic as to the 
effectiveness of ‘communication power.’ The second way is to project an image of state power. 
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Controlling media coverage can itself be a show of strength. Lacking that control not only concedes 
the narrative contest but can also exemplify state weakness. Note what communication power is 
not. It is not what Couldry (2001: 157) calls ‘media power’, which denotes the symbolic power 
that media institutions have relative to other actors in society (see also Couldry and Curran 2003). 
Nor is it ‘reflexive control’—a term that analysts use to describe purported psychological 
operations that seek to alter the perceptions of target decision-makers so that they end up making 
unfavourable decisions to themselves (Thomas, 2004). Communication power is not necessarily 
the public diplomacy efforts or information operations that state security services or military 
organisations may direct, which are what interest many studies of how armed forces do strategic 
communications (Cioppa, 2009; Diebert et al, 2002). Whether communication power is effective 
or not, what matters is that the state deploys media resources to advance narratives and images that 
align with its foreign policy interests.  
 
Below, we show that communication power has been a stock variable with respect to 
Russia’s use of military force since the 1990s. States have communication power when they exert 
a high level of control over domestic news media, as in the case of Russia given what Castells 
(2009: 268-277) documents; use international news outlets or subsidiaries abroad to promote 
messages and narratives; commit additional resources to those media outlets; and impose strict 
controls on the activities of international correspondents in conflict zones where its military forces 
operate. We see these attributes of communication power develop across different military 
campaigns: over time, the Russian state has come to see that ‘the main battlefield in today’s 
warfare is perception’ and accordingly has gained control of media outlets, used RT to broadcast 
preferred narratives, and restricted correspondents’ movements (Adamsky, 2018: 40). Certainly, 
states can cultivate communication power for various reasons, whether because of domestic 
politics, global technological developments (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2015), or, as flagged here, 
a strategy for shaping narratives surrounding military campaigns and state power. These factors 
appear in the cases below. Similarly, developing military power can reflect a separate logic based 
on what adversaries have, past military performance, social preferences, or some mix thereof 
(Brooks, 2007). 
 
Our central contention is that, at least in the Russian context, media policy cannot be 
separated from military power. Although they perform an invaluable service by recording and 
analysing conflict narratives, the problem with many studies to date is that, once we take this 
perspective, their findings are often unsurprising: Russian media outlets would, of course, 
favourably and prejudicially report a military conflict waged by the Kremlin. That is the point of 
communication power. Nevertheless, we want to show below that the Russian state’s nurturing of 
communication power has been historically contingent and, indeed, has co-varied with the 
development of military power.  
 
Methodology and Case Studies 
 
Our essay is exploratory. Although we use empirical data to substantiate our claims, we do not 
engage in hypothesis testing per se. Our goal instead is to advance the concept of ‘communication 
power’, which we argue is distinct from ‘soft power’ and can serve as a complement to ‘military 
power,’ and to demonstrate that the Kremlin has emphasized how its military actions are reported. 
Our purpose here is to explore this relationship rather than to test specific hypotheses, and so we 
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rely on secondary sources, journalists’ recollections, and interviews. We examine how Russian 
communication power developed throughout the Chechen Wars, the 2008 war against Georgia, 
and the military campaign against Ukraine since 2014. These illustrative cases thus constitute 
‘plausibility probes’ that showcase the potential utility of our approach. As Jack Levy (2008: 6-7) 
explains, the ‘aim is to give the reader a “feel” for a theoretical argument by providing a concrete 
example of its application, or to demonstrate the empirical relevance of a theoretical proposition 
by identifying at least one relevant case.’ 
 
The Chechen Wars 
 
The two Chechen wars concerned the political status of the Chechen Republic after the Soviet 
Union collapsed (Sagramoso, 2007). Amid political instability in Moscow, Chechen leaders 
perceived an opportunity to gain national independence for the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. 
Nevertheless, authorities in Moscow wished to preserve federal control over the North Caucasus, 
partly to stem further territorial losses of the sort that attended the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
 
Holding such objectives, the Russian military opted to fight a conventional war in its first 
major attempt to quash the rebellion in 1994 and 1995. Russia’s campaign strategy involved using 
its advantages in manpower and firepower against Chechen rebels, hoping to capture the capital 
city of Grozny and to decapitate their leadership (Arquilla and Karasik, 1999: 208). The economic 
dislocations that Russia suffered in the early 1990s adversely affected the military. Its personnel 
went unpaid and saw benefits cut as Moscow adopted drastic economic reforms aimed at reducing 
the government deficit. Russia even disbanded the last of those units that had specialised in urban 
warfare (Galeotti, 2014: 24). The output of the Russian defence industry fell about 80% between 
1989 and 1999 (Izyumov, Kosals, and Ryvkina, 2000: 216). Thus, when Russia’s military 
campaign in the North Caucasus began in December 1994, it was enfeebled by poor morale and 
equipment. 
 
Fighting in and around Grozny exemplified the conflict. The Russian Army besieged the 
city with a major bombardment and attempted to enter it with columns of heavy armour. 
Nevertheless, Russian regular forces found themselves unable to use their heavy weapons 
effectively in Grozny and were vulnerable to Chechen guerrilla fighters’ ambushes, roadblocks, 
and hit-and-run tactics (Arquilla and Karasik, 1999). When the assault on Grozny began, the chaos 
in command resulted not only in massive casualties, but also in unrestricted access for journalists—
with the result that they were able to tell and to show the story in all its bloody disorder. The French 
photographer Patrick Chauvel later recounted how he had seen Chechen fighters hunting down 
hapless Russian soldiers ‘with swords, knives, and pistols’ (Gall & De Waal, 1997: 9). He also 
‘estimated he saw 800 dead Russian bodies’ (Gall & De Waal, 1997: 12). The Russian army 
eventually subdued Grozny but only after decimating it, incurring significant casualties, and 
suffering poor morale. In August 1996, Chechen rebels infiltrated the city and used their familiarity 
with the terrain to regain control of it, thereby leading to a ceasefire that ended the First Chechen 
War. This first stage of the campaign was, for Russia, a military disaster widely reported by 
international correspondents. 
 
For if the military operation lacked planning and strategic appropriateness, the media 
policy was non-existent. Correspondents who covered that conflict use the phrase ‘free for all’ to 
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describe the kind of access that they had to the theatre of military operation). (Sheets, 2019; 
Franchetti, 2019). ‘You could just fly to Chechnya and do whatever you wanted. You wouldn't 
have access to the Russian army, but you certainly were able to move around freely and have 
access to the rebels,’ remembers Mark Franchetti (2019) of the London Sunday Times. . Lawrence 
Sheets  (2019), who reported on the conflict for Reuters, recalls similar working conditions: ‘The 
first war was total chaos, so nobody cared what you were doing, and they did not have the ability 
or the inclination to sort of monitor everybody. It was a free-for-all, right?’  
 
There is an important political point about media control here: if international 
correspondents felt that the Russian state did not care what they were doing, then they were in 
effect enjoying extensive freedom to operate. Russia’s ‘communication power’ in this period was 
far less significant than it would be later on, as was the desire to deploy it, even had it existed. 
Russian journalists then also ‘told of the Russian army’s incompetence and the atrocities carried 
out by its troops’ (Service, 2003: 533). That they did so shows how that incompetence extended 
to a lack of control over the media. The spirit of media freedom characteristic of the late Soviet 
and early post-Soviet period still endured. As Ilya Kiriya (2019: 12) argues, this period saw a 
confluence of economic pressures that ‘pushed the media into the hands of big oligarchs.’ 
Nevertheless, during the First Chechen War, their grasp was not yet completely tight. 
 
The armistice following the First Chechen War proved unstable. Chechen authorities failed 
to maintain local political control as infighting intensified among local warlords and religious 
militants tried to invade neighbouring Dagestan. Terrorist bombings attributed to Chechen 
separatists also rocked Russia in 1999. President Boris Yeltsin’s newly appointed prime minister—
Vladimir Putin—made Chechnya a priority and participated in planning for a new military 
operation aimed at restoring federal control over the breakaway republic (Lapidus, 2002: 41-43). 
Beginning in August 1999, the Second Chechen War saw Russian military’s tactics improve 
despite various budgetary and manpower difficulties. It launched a major air campaign that 
bombarded Chechen militant positions before undertaking a slow ground advance on Grozny, 
implementing various coercive measures designed to curb the insurgency. Although Russia 
established direct rule over Grozny in May 2000, an insurgency continued for another decade. 
Morale and equipment problems persisted, but the Russian military did not experience the major 
tactical failures and strategic reversals as in the First Chechen War (Kramer, 2005).   
 
 When the Second Chechen War began in the fall of 1999, the situation was already 
different. Under the new prime minister, the Russian government exercised communication power 
in the form of greater control over, and restrictions on, the activities of foreign journalists. ‘During 
the second war, it was really difficult,’ Sheets remembers. ‘Because the Russians had gotten smart, 
to be honest with you, and you needed like 18 documents and officially you had to go on official 
trips’ (Sheets, 2019). The time of the ‘free for all’ was over. Franchetti agrees. He sees the kind of 
coverage that resulted from the first war as the reason for the changes, especially once the Russian 
government ‘realized that, actually, this is a lot of bad press coming out of Chechnya they started—
in the second war, certainly—becoming much more organized. So, you had special passes, you 
were supposed to have accreditation, you were not supposed to go to Chechnya unless it was some 
organised tour by the Foreign Ministry’ (Franchetti, 2019). These restrictions, part of what the 
Kremlin described as a ‘counter-terrorist operation’, remained in place until 2009 (Solovyev, 




Inevitably, the coverage changed. Correspondents were unable to travel as freely into 
Chechnya as they had five years earlier. Many based themselves in the neighbouring region of 
Ingushetia—also the destination of refugees escaping from the war zone. The refugees’ second-
hand accounts were a valuable source for the reporting of a conflict from which correspondents 
were deliberately kept at a distance (Lagnado, 1999). There were other hazards like kidnapping. 
Earlier in 1999, four foreign telecommunications engineers—three British, one New Zealander—
had been beheaded by their captors after ransom negotiations failed (Reeves and Buncombe, 
1999). Despite these obstacles and dangers, some independent reporting from inside Chechnya 
was possible. Sheets says that he went on the official tours, and would ‘then go back to Chechnya 
on my own trip, which was expensive, you needed a personal guard.’  His experience, along with 
that of other reporters such as Maggie O’Kane and Amelia Gentleman of The Guardian, who also 
got into Chechnya, shows that the ban was not total. As Sheets (2019) says of the Russian 
authorities, ‘Of course they knew what was going on.’ Even if the rules were inconsistently 
enforced, Franchetti sees their very existence as a significant shift in policy:  
 
‘We all broke those rules and there weren't really any consequences. But what’s interesting is 
that they started having those rules. And they started monitoring more what we were doing, 
what we were writing, and they were trying to control us more.’ (Franchetti, 2019) 
 
This process continued throughout Russia’s revival as a military force.  
 
The 2008 Russian-Georgian War 
 
Russia fought a brief war with Georgia in August 2008. The causes of this war were complex. 
Georgia struggled to maintain territorial control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia when the Soviet 
Union collapsed, leading to two separate wars in the early 1990s that ended favourably enough for 
those breakaway regions to enjoy Russian support and to remain largely free from direct control 
by Tbilisi. This uneasy equilibrium persisted until the early 2000s when, following the Rose 
Revolution, Mikheil Saakashvili became president with the goal of strengthening Georgian state 
institutions while pursuing a pro-western foreign policy (Mitchell, 2006). Indeed, he sought 
Georgian membership in NATO and a restoration of its territorial integrity. Such ambitions put 
him into conflict with Putin, who had spent the previous eight years consolidating executive power 
while rebuilding the Russian military. The balance of power between the two historical antagonists 
was in flux. Although NATO declined to offer Georgia an institutional pathway towards 
membership earlier in 2008, tensions intensified, with each side accusing and counter-accusing the 
other of bad faith (Fawn and Nalbandov, 2012).  
 
 The military strategy that Russia used against Georgia had several features. Already by 
summer 2008 did Russia have some military personnel positioned in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
on the pretext that they were a peacekeeping force. These forces not only advised local paramilitary 
forces that would eventually fight Georgian regular forces, but also provided training and combat 
support. When Georgia launched an attack near Tskhinvali, a move that drew controversy over 
whether Georgia was an instigator or a victim (Cheterian. 2009), the Russian military mobilized 
and fought Georgian forces in and around South Ossetia. Russian forces subsequently launched 
airstrikes against Gori and Tbilisi in addition to imposing a naval blockade on the seaport city of 
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Poti. They also participated in an Abkhaz attack on the Kodori Gorge—the one area of Abkhazia 
that Georgia controlled before the war (Vendil Pallin and Westerlund, 2009: 404-407). 
Contemporaneously, in probably the first cyber-attack during an active war ever, Georgian internet 
servers and government websites were hacked. After four days of fighting, Georgia and Russia 
reached a ceasefire agreement, with the then Russian President Dmitri Medvedev declaring that 
‘the security of our peacekeeping brigade and civilian population has been restored. The aggressor 
has been punished and suffered very heavy losses’ (quoted in Nichol, 2009: 11). 
 
Russia achieved a strategic victory that resulted in newly established military bases in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, its recognition of those breakaway provinces’ sovereignty, and the 
removal of Georgians from those disputed territories. Nevertheless, the campaign exposed serious 
deficiencies in the Russian military. Command and control problems hampered operations, with 
key officials out of contact during the earlier phases of the conflict, obsolete communication 
systems stymieing units’ ability to talk to each other in the battlespace; electronic warfare 
capabilities inadequate to the task of knocking out Georgian air defences; and outdated intelligence 
equipment unable to track Georgian movements and to spot targets for artillery fire (McDermott, 
2009: 69-70). The army and the air force were hardly interoperable (Vendil Pallin and Westerlund, 
2009: 404). Many key weapon systems in the Russian arsenal went surprisingly unused 
(McDermott, 2009: 70). Russia appears to have won ultimately by dint of enjoying significant 
numerical superiority over an adversary in a conventional war. Accordingly, Russia embarked 
upon a new modernization program to enhance its military. Although the first effort stalled in part 
due to corruption, a more serious effort began in 2010 and has underpinned the recent revitalisation 
of Russian military power in the last decade (Renz, 2018). 
 
Accompanying this revitalisation of military power has been a far more controlling 
approach to the media, both domestic and international. As Kiriya (2019: 13) observes, ‘Since 
2005, there has been a clear increase in the share of state-owned television, as well as a quasi-
takeover of all political media outlets by oligarchic groups close to the Kremlin.’ But even before 
2005, Putin had moved to consolidate his grip over the media environment, targeting media moguls 
like Vladimir Gusinsky in order to gain control of the three most significant television channels in 
Russia (Lipman, 2009). After 2005, state pressure on media outlets intensified. Though state 
culpability remains unclear, assassinations of journalists like Anna Politkovskaya—known for her 
critical coverage of the Second Chechen War—symbolised the dangerous environment in which 
the press was now operating. Television, print media, and radio experienced either state 
domination or tight restrictions. 
 
Leaders sitting in the Kremlin had often enjoyed engaging with foreign correspondents. 
Joseph Stalin gave interviews to New York Times reporter Walter Duranty (1930: 1), and to Eugene 
Lyons of United Press. Nikita Khrushchev met members of the Moscow foreign press corps ‘at 
diplomatic and Kremlin receptions—often as much as once a week’ (Rettie, 2006: 192). As part 
of his perestroika reforms in the 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev also engaged with international media. 
Early in his presidency, Putin tried a more contemporary version of the interview, a ‘webcast’ with 
the BBC, to which 24,000 questions were submitted. ‘The idea, I think, was to make him look like 
a globally connected Internet president,’ says Bridget Kendall, who conducted the interview 
(Kendall, 2019). Such interactions with the international media were insufficient. Perhaps still 
reeling from over a decade of bad news stories of the economic chaos that followed the end of 
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communism, Putin’s administration wanted to exert greater control over Russia, and the way its 
story was told. In 2005, a new English-language television channel, Russia Today, was launched, 
aimed at an international audience. By the time Russian troops went into action in South Ossetia 
in 2008, the media campaign too had become more sophisticated. Deibert et al (2012: 8) 
persuasively argue that ‘information-shaping operations occurred at the strategic level in the form 
of strategic communication channelled through traditional and new media. The Russian military 
entered the campaign in Georgia influenced by its recent experiences in Chechnya.’ 
 
Russia spent some of its soaring oil and gas revenues on western public relations advice. 
In May 2006, the U.S. public relations company Ketchum won ‘a multi-million dollar contract’ to 
help polish Russia’s image during its presidency of the Group-of-Eight (Buckley, 2006). However, 
it ended up enlisted to undertake media spin when Russia launched its South Ossetian campaign 
in 2008. The Georgian government had made similar preparations. A debate followed over which 
side started that conflict (Fawn and Nalbandov, 2012; Rodgers, 2012: 59-60). What matters here 
was the extent of the preparation. The Russian government and presidential administration wanted 
to convey their message. Not trusting their own abilities to engage directly with the international 
media, they employed western spin doctors. The spin doctors used a western approach—offering 
access to senior officials, pressing those who had the best command of English into service in the 
public relations war (Fawn and Nalbandov, 2012: 60). Russia Today was already part of Moscow’s 
media arsenal, but was only deployed in a limited way. While Russian foreign minister, Sergei 
Lavrov, on 9 August 2008, granted one-to-one interviews with the BBC, CNN, and other 
international news channels, Russia Today was shut out. Instead, it simply rebroadcast Lavrov’s 
interview with the BBC, later posting a transcript on the Russian Foreign Ministry website 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2008). Perhaps the Russian political 
establishment did not yet see their own media outlet as having anything like the influence of those 
western channels it sought to emulate and to challenge.  
 
The Kremlin may not have felt entirely pleased with the results. Saakashvili, perhaps 
having realized that the military campaign was lost, spent an extraordinary amount of time on 
English language international news channels when he might have been expected to be discussing 
military and diplomatic matters with his generals and ministers. The Georgian authorities also 
welcomed any international media wishing to cover the story from their side of the conflict. 
Russia’s media policy combined different approaches. In Moscow, there were conference calls, 
emails, and interviews with officials. Access to the theatre of military operations was a different 
matter. The Russian army did not permit any international reporters to accompany its troops or 
visit their positions, although they did so the following fall when they wished to show that they 
were relinquishing territory captured during the conflict (Rodgers, 2008). Those correspondents 
who approached Russian positions independently found no such slick media operation. Andrew 
Wilson (2019), of Sky News, found that he and his team were ‘trapped on the wrong side of the 
Russian advance.’ Trying to reach the Georgian city of Gori, then surrounded by Russian troops, 
Wilson and his team were robbed at gunpoint by South Ossetian irregulars, allies of the Russians. 
Russian tank crews nearby saw it all happen, Wilson (2019) says, ‘and did absolutely nothing 
about it. They just watched it take place.’ Correspondents covering armed conflict generally accept 
that they will face danger. When travelling with an army, they expect to be afforded some security. 
The inactivity of the soldiers on this occasion suggested, however, a willingness to let journalists 
not travelling with the army face grave danger alone. The military objectives in South Ossetia were 
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achieved, even if deficiencies in the armed forces were exposed. Official policy no longer tolerated 
the media ‘free for all’ of the previous decade, but Russia still did not afford its own international 
news channel, then still called Russia Today, the same access it offered to established western 
networks. Both shortcomings in Russian communication power, as we define it, would be 
remedied by the time conflict broke out with Ukraine in 2014.   
 
Russia’s War against Ukraine, 2014—Present 
 
Russian military operations against Ukraine began in February 2014 with the annexation of 
Crimea. Shortly thereafter Russia started providing military support to insurgents in eastern 
Ukraine who had declared that the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics were now 
independent from Kiev.  
 
This ongoing war began for several reasons. One background factor was that Russian 
leaders were never entirely comfortable with the notion of Ukraine being politically sovereign. 
From their perspective, Ukraine was best when its leaders aligned the country with Russian 
interests. Any strong assertion of Ukrainian autonomy provoked responses by Russia that critics 
alleged were tantamount to domestic meddling, as what happened during the 2004 Orange 
Revolution (Kuzio, 2005: 505-509). The more proximate causes involved the mass movement that 
protested President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to reject suddenly an association agreement 
with the European Union in favour of joining the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. 
Protestors gathered around the country—most notably in and around Maidan Square in Kyiv—
and stayed put despite increasingly strong repressive measures adopted by Yanukovych’s 
government. After Yanukovych fled Ukraine, members of the political opposition took power. 
With its political legitimacy in question given the extra-constitutional character of Yanukovych’s 
overthrow, the new leaders in Kyiv had trouble projecting authority. One fateful action that the 
Ukrainian parliament undertook involved repealing language laws that gave regional status to 
Russian and other languages. By this time Russia had already decided to annex Crimea (Treisman, 
2014: 52), but further pretext was given to it for abetting an insurrection against Kiev in the eastern 
parts of Ukraine where Russia is predominantly spoken. 
 
The ambiguous character of Russia’s warfare against Ukraine prompted many observers to 
invoke various adjectives—most commonly among them being ‘hybrid’ (see Lanoszka, 2016; 
Renz, 2016). This ambiguity served to give Russia a degree of ‘plausible deniability’ regarding its 
own military intervention (Allison, 2014). To annex Crimea, where many of its inhabitants had 
already reported pro-Russian sentiments in various opinion polls, unmarked armed soldiers—
‘little green men’—had suddenly appeared manning checkpoints and taking over strategic sites 
around the main port city of Sebastopol and elsewhere on the peninsula (O’Loughlin and Toal, 
2019). With pro-Russian demonstrations already underway, these masked troops assumed control 
of the Supreme Council of Crimea and installed a pro-Russian leader before announcing a 
referendum on the peninsula’s territorial status. Such swift action was possible because Russia 
already had an extensive military presence thanks to its Black Sea Fleet being stationed in 
Sebastopol. Pro-Russian protests swept cities in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine before 
armed insurgents began seizing key government buildings there. These insurgents aimed at 
establishing a new confederation in eastern Ukraine called Novorossiya. To restore political 
control, the Ukrainian army mobilized to fight the separatist forces. The scale of the involvement 
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of Russian paramilitary forces in this insurgency remains unclear (Wilson, 2016). What is clear is 
that the Ukrainian military was able to fight effectively in early June. For this reason, Russia 
stepped up its assistance of the rebels by way of convoys that most likely contained military 
equipment (Czuperski et al, 2015: 8). Shortly thereafter, insurgents regained what territory they 
had previously lost, pushing Ukraine to negotiate a ceasefire called the Minsk Protocol. This 
ceasefire would soon collapse due to more heavy fighting. A second ceasefire, called Minsk II, 
was announced. Much of the fighting since has been along the line of contact. Although it has been 
labelled as a ‘frozen conflict’, it remains lethal, with at least 13,000 individuals killed since April 
2014. 
 
 Despite the equivocal nature of Russia’s involvement, the war in Donbas has been mostly 
waged conventionally. Despite frequent invocations of the term ‘hybrid warfare’, Bettina Renz 
notes that ‘there is very little similarity, from a strategic point of view, between the Crimea 
operation and the fighting in Donbas’ (Renz, 2018: 184). The former consisted of achieving 
surprise by way of a fait accompli and without the need to do battle. The latter mixed proxy actors 
with auxiliary fighters in a bid to prolong the war so as to sap Ukraine’s military power and interest 
in fighting (Bowen, 2019). Accordingly, Russia has had mixed success. It seized Crimea quickly 
and almost bloodlessly, but Novorossiya failed as a political project. Indeed, Russia escalated its 
military involvement in eastern Ukraine because its proxy forces were losing. Still, if the aim has 
been to sustain a land war in the Donbas that will impose continuous costs on Ukraine such that it 
suffers economically and even politically, then Russia may have had some success (Grossman, 
2018: 60). Although Ukraine eventually signed the association agreement that Yanukovych had 
negotiated and spurned, its likelihood of joining NATO remains slim despite receiving military 
aid from the United States and others.  
 
The military resources committed to pursue Russia’s objectives in Ukraine have been 
mirrored in those provided to the Kremlin-backed international media. It has been their task to tell 
the story of this success—limited though it may be. The annexation of Crimea prompted extensive 
western sanctions, so Russia can hardly boast of a total triumph. In promoting their government’s 
narrative to the world, Russian media have also striven to counter the accounts of those—such as 
the United States and the European Union—who judge Moscow’s actions there to be a grave 
breach of international law. Russia Today was rebranded in 2009 as RT—perhaps to simplify its 
name in searches; perhaps to obscure its Russian origins. As the Kremlin placed increasing 
importance on how its actions were seen around the world, with mass communication  being 
‘considered by the Russian leadership to be a crucial arena of the competitive struggle’ (Szostek, 
2016: 571), RT also benefited from significantly increased financial resources: budgets that might 
make editors at those western news channels whose coverage it was intended to challenge swoon 
with envy. Figures quoted in The Guardian in early 2015 suggested ‘greatly increased projected 
spending’ with the television channel itself due to receive $245m, and its sister organization, the 
state news agency Rossiya Segodnya (the name means ‘Russia Today’ in Russian) receiving the 
rouble equivalent of $103m (Luhn, 2015). The latter, despite its more modest budget, is at least 
equally significant. Its social media accounts, including Twitter, where it suggests that it ‘exists to 
tell the stories that aren’t being told’, are an example of another of the ways that Russian media 
have adapted western platforms to promote their own narratives. This is an openly declared policy. 
Russia’s 2016 Foreign Policy Concept, published two years after the annexation of Crimea, and 
when the conflict in eastern Ukraine was also already two years old, listed among Russia’s ‘main 
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objectives’ in international affairs ‘to bolster the standing of Russian mass media and 
communication tools in the global information space and convey Russia’s perspective on 
international process to a wider international community’ (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation, 2016). In the case of armed conflict and annexing part of a neighbouring state, 
this aim echoes what Hoskins and O’Loughlin call ‘Arrested War’, a recent, more global trend 
whereby policy-makers and militaries have begun to appropriate and to leverage media against 
adversaries (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2015: 1327-1328). 
 
When the ‘little green men’ arrived in Crimea to take control, those western correspondents 
who were there reported the presence of ‘well-armed men in camouflage with no insignia who 
refused to identify themselves,’ as one journalist, Ben Hoyle (2014), noted. Hoyle was not fooled, 
but nor could he be completely sure. ‘Thirteen Russian aircraft thought to be carrying up to 2,000 
troops landed in Crimea last night,’ his report began. As Hoskins and O’Loughlin highlight, the 
footage of the ‘little green men’ ‘may have originated through camera phone recordings but these 
soon reached mainstream media. Moreover, Russia was comfortable with this ‘leaked’ footage 
appearing in mainstream television news’ (Hoskins and O'Loughlin, 2015: 1330). Whatever the 
overall success or otherwise of the media strategies that Russia used to accompany its military 
operations in Ukraine, the tactic employed here did what was intended. The Russian Defence 
Ministry could have invited western correspondents to accompany troops, or have distributed 
official footage shot by a military cameraman. That would not have served the desired purpose at 
the time. The purpose of the ‘little green men’ was to allow the Kremlin to deny—however 
implausibly—that they were the spearhead of a military operation, the ultimate objective of which 
was the annexation of Crimea. The ‘leaked’ footage served a parallel purpose: allowing the 
Russian army to show that it was taking over the peninsula, without specifically stating—yet—
that it was actually doing so.  
 
The original source of such material is hard to establish. Its nature would suggest it was 
either by a serving soldier or by a civilian the army’s knowledge. Its provenance is not the most 
important question. Its real significance is its existence, and the nature of its distribution. It reached 
‘mainstream television news’ without the Russian army having to engage directly with 
‘mainstream television news’. Unlike in Chechnya, the Russian army in Crimea was in control of 
the situation, and so could not object to the world knowing what was going on, even if, at that 
stage, the world could only form very well-grounded suspicions of what was really happening. 
The dissemination of the Russian army’s message in this unofficial and unchallenged way may be 
seen as a use of communication power. Even so, the distribution of similar material risks 
backfiring. The Bellingcat investigation into the MH17 disaster used open source material to 
conclude that Russian-backed separatists in Eastern Ukraine were responsible for the shooting 
down of the Malaysian Airlines passenger plane in July 2014 (Bellingcat, 2020). Golovchenko et 
al’s (2019) work on Twitter and disinformation in the aftermath of that disaster illustrates the 
difficulties of controlling narratives on social media. 
 
As Russia’s military activities in Ukraine continued, Russian media also sought to promote 
less well-grounded versions of events, including some notorious examples, such as a gruesome—
and untrue—story of a crucifixion (Stop Fake, 2014). For Neil Buckley (2019) of the Financial 
Times, who has covered Russia for many years including a posting as Moscow bureau chief, 
atrocity stories such as these were ‘a real turning point.’ Buckley cites the crucifixion ‘story’ and 
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reports of refugees ‘streaming across into Russia because they were so afraid of this neo-Nazi 
regime that had come to power. It was complete rubbish. The borders were quiet.’ Post-Soviet 
Russia’s military operations began in Chechnya, where a catastrophic campaign and a chaotic 
media environment made a mockery of frequent official claims that all was quiet, and that order 
was being restored. As Russian military power revived in the 2010s, the Kremlin developed a 
media strategy based on deception—one that availed itself of the communication power it had 
cultivated. The transformation from all but denying a mass exodus of civilians, to creating reports 
of one where there was none, was complete.  
 
Russian Communication Power in Perspective 
 
At least two observations regarding how Russia has undertaken military campaigns since the 1990s 
must be highlighted. One is that the First Chechen War saw the Russian military hobbled by 
various deficiencies while the Russian state exerted little to no control over the reporting of that 
conflict. By 2014, those weaknesses that characterised Russian military and communication power 
no longer existed: Russia had revived its military and had become more confident in using media 
outlets to project a certain image of its actions. Military effectiveness and communication power 
co-vary. The other observation is that although communication power is a separate domain, it can 
complement military power. Different logics may have driven the develop of each. A state like 
Russia accumulates military power in order to deter or to defeat adversaries on the battlefield, 
whether close to home or not. Military power also permits broader engagement in international 
affairs, especially by way of political interventions in other countries’ conflicts. Communication 
power can reflect a desire to project certain images of the conflict or to promote one’s political 
goals therein so as to build international and domestic support. However, the Kremlin has also 
nurtured communication power to consolidate its political authority at home while squeezing out 
the competition. Indeed, the cases indicate a slight chronological gap between the expansion of 
Russia’s military and Russia’s use of outlets like RT as a vehicle for broadcasting its preferred 
narratives. 
 
 Note what we do not argue. Our conception of communication power does not rely on 
military doctrine or perceptions thereof. Many pundits and observers got enamoured with the now 
discredited notion of the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’—a military strategy often ascribed to Russia that 
envisions the use of subversion and disinformation prior to the employment of kinetic military 
force (Galeotti, 2019). In our view, the executive—in this case, the Kremlin—maintains and wields 
communication power independently of its military. Nor do we imply that our empirical discussion 
should be read as a history of how so-called Russian hybrid warfare has developed. After all, 
‘hybrid warfare’ largely appears in Russian military writings as a description of Western activities 
aimed at Russia. It does not provide an accurate description of Russian military doctrine 
(Pynnöniemi and Jokela, 2020). Moreover, the Russian armed forces still go about their military 
campaigns on a largely conventional basis, with doctrine and weapons procurement aligned 
accordingly (Renz, 2018). Consider Russia’s military operations in Syria. Much of how Russia has 
gone about them would look familiar to military experts (see Kofman and Rojansky, 2018), but 
evidence also exists of an effective social media campaign undertaken by RT to promote Russia’s 
narrative of the war (Metzger and Siegel, 2019). To say that Russia wages hybrid warfare would 
obscure the tactical and operational continuities in how the war is being fought on the ground and 
in the air. To the extent that the concept might have analytical utility, it could refer to efforts to 
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control military escalation by way of engaging in subversion while exploiting local military 
dominance (Lanoszka, 2016). Such efforts may or may not involve communication power, 
however. 
 
Our exploratory study is only a first step. More research is needed on this subject. As 
suggested above, Syria is another case study that can investigate the complementarity of Russian 
communication power and military power. It would also be worth considering how our concept as 
it relates to other English-language international media channels—such as China Global 
Television Network or Al-Jazeera—that enjoy substantial financial support from states. Our 
approach is softly positivist and rationalist inasmuch as we argue that ‘communication power’ is 
a variable that, at least in the Russian context, co-evolves with military power and can be used 
instrumentally by the state to project certain images or narratives. Yet scholars could adopt a 
different approach, one anchored in more constructivist perspectives , to explore how discourses 
of power, more generally, have developed in Russian military and political writings since the 
1990s, and how those very discourses illuminate the Kremlin’s own interpretation of events and 
military choices. Alternatively, further research could explore the effects of communication 
power—something that we have consciously avoided. This endeavour admittedly faces many 
challenges. Notwithstanding the role of chance, military outcomes hinge on the balance of power, 
leadership, appropriate army training, weather, and other factors that also need to be considered. 
The use of communication power itself turns on reach and receptivity, the effects of which political 
prejudice and competition can dull (Lanoszka, 2019). Regardless of approach, to bring the state 
back in while distinguishing between communication power and military power, however, need 
not lead to problematic invocations of hybrid warfare. It simply reminds us that other parts of the 
Russian state are involved in the information domain during wartime, as Simonyan’s quote at the 
outset of our essay indicates. We should not conflate communication power with military power, 
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